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Abstract 
 
Uncertainty is an important factor that influences social evolution in natural and artificial 
environments. Here we distinguish between three aspects of uncertainty. Environmental 
uncertainty is the variance of resources in the environment, perceived uncertainty is the 
variance of the resource distribution as perceived by the organism and effective uncertainty 
is the variance of resources effectively enjoyed by individuals.  We show   analytically that 
perceived uncertainty is larger than environmental uncertainty and that effective 
uncertainty is smaller than perceived uncertainty, when cooperation is present. We use an 
agent society simulation in a two dimensional world for the generation of simulation data 
as one realisation of the analytical results. Together with our earlier theoretical work, 
results here show that cooperation can buffer the detrimental effects of uncertainty on the 
organism. The proposed conceptualisation of uncertainty can help in understanding its 
effects on social evolution and in designing artificial social environments. 
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Introduction
Our aim here is to examine the nature of uncertainty in natural environments and its influence on 
cooperation in societies of organisms. We distinguish between three types of uncertainty that we term 
environmental, perceived and effective uncertainty (what we here call environmental and perceived 
uncertainty might, in a psychological or biological context, alternatively be termed objective and 
subjective uncertainty respectively). We define environmental uncertainty as the variance of outcomes 
of events influencing the fitness of the organism. These events can take a variety of forms, such as 
interactions with resources, competitors or mates, but for simplicity we focus on resource distribution 
in this paper. We define perceived uncertainty as the variance of the resource distribution as perceived 
by the organism and effective uncertainty as the variance of the resources effectively enjoyed by the 
individuals living in the environment. We show here how these aspects of environmental uncertainty 
are calculated and analyse the relationship between them. We then consider how cooperation between 
individuals (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Fehr and Rockenbach 2003) influences the effective 
uncertainty of resources gained. 
Elsewhere we have shown theoretically that environmental uncertainty and perceived uncertainty 
(Andras et al. 2003, Andras and Lazarus 2005) increase cooperation. This theoretical work is supported 
by findings in human behaviour. Common pool resource groups, such as fisheries, tend to endure 
where there is greater environmental uncertainty (Ostrom 1990), and sharing in human laboratory 
experiments increases when gains are more uncertain (Kameda et al. 2002). We are not aware of 
comparable studies in non-human species.  Here we show that cooperation reduces effective 
uncertainty and thus responds adaptively to increases in environmental and perceived uncertainty by 
buffering the organism against what otherwise would be a corresponding increase in the variance of 
resources gained.  The advantage to the organism in reducing effective uncertainty is that it reduces the 
probability of damagingly low resource intake rates. Although it correspondingly reduces the 
probability of gaining very high intake rates this cost is less than the benefit of avoiding low intake 
rates since fitness is commonly a diminishing returns function of resource level (Andras and Lazarus 
2005). 
   
Figure 1: The determination of the minimum acceptable amount of resources: the horizontal axis 
shows the amount of resources; the vertical axis shows the expected benefits gained from a given 
amount of resources and also the corresponding expected cost of the exploration; the curved continuous 
line is the graph of the expected benefits (a diminishing returns graph); the continuous straight line is 
the graph of expected costs; the minimum acceptable amount of resources Rm is the resource value for 
which the cost and benefit curves intersect. 
Following an analytical treatment of uncertainty and cooperation we use an agent society simulation 
approach (Andras et al. 2003) to examine how our analytical findings are expressed in a particular 
social scenario. In our simulated world the agents play prisoners’ dilemma (Axelrod and Hamilton 
1981) type games in order to generate new resources, using their existing resources. We chose the 
prisoner’s dilemma scenario for interactions between agents because this is a commonly used scenario 
in theoretical work on cooperation (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Milinski et al. 2002; Nowak and 
Sigmund 1998; Riolo et al. 2001; Roberts and Sherratt 1998) and allows the comparison of our results 
with other work on similar topics. Environmental uncertainty is represented as the variance of newly 
generated resources. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relationship between 
environmental and perceived uncertainty and in Section 3 the relationship between perceived and 
effective uncertainty when individuals cooperate. In Section 4 the agent society simulation is described 
and conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
Environmental and perceived uncertainty 
Without restricting the level of generality, we consider uncertainty in terms of variance of resource 
distributions. Let us denote by D(R) for R!0 the probability density function of a distribution of 
resources in an individual’s environment, and let !2 be the variance of this distribution. The 
environmental uncertainty is !2, the variance of the distribution of resources in the environment. We 
assume that the variance of the resource distribution is finite. This assumption is valid for a wide range 
of natural resource distributions (at least within their usual observable range). However, we note that it 
is possible for a resource distribution to have infinite variance (e.g. stock market) with significant effect 
on the observable range of the distribution.
Individuals cannot perceive the full distribution of the resources. The reason for this is that they 
might be selective (e.g., ignoring too small amounts of resources), or are limited in their ability to 
exploit all the resources in the environment. We capture this situation by choosing a sufficiently 
general scenario, that of the selective rejection of low amounts of resources caused by the harshness of 
the environment (e.g., cold, arid or dangerous environment). In a harsher environment it is more costly 
for individuals to explore resources, raising the minimum amount of acceptable resource (i.e., the 
amount at which the benefit gained equals the exploration costs). For example, in the case of rodent 
foraging individuals shift to more profitable foods under conditions of high predation risk (Hay and 
Fuller, 1981; Bowers, 1988). 
Resources are considered acceptable by individuals only if R>Rm, where Rm is the minimum 
amount of acceptable resource, which is the amount of resources at which the expected cost of 
exploring the resource is equal to the benefits gained from exploring the resource (see Figure 1). This 
means that the part of the resource distribution corresponding to resource values R" Rm is ignored by 
individuals living in this environment, subjectively equating this part of the distribution with a Dirac " 
distribution centred in 0 multiplied by the probability 
 
(1) 
We assume that the harshness of the environment is not excessive, in the sense that more than half of 
the full resource distribution is in the acceptable range of individuals, i.e. 
 
(2) 
The perceived uncertainty is the variance of the perceived resource distribution. The perceived 
resource distribution has the following probability density function: 
 
 
(3) 
Calculating the variance of the perceived resource distribution we get: 
 
(4) 
Where #s is the mean of the perceived resource distribution. (We note that replacing the ignored part of 
the environmental resource distribution with the above specified Dirac " distribution, means that in 
terms of mean and variance calculations we do not ignore the segment of the perceived distribution 
between 0 and Rm, instead for this portion we consider the Dirac " component of the perceived 
resource distribution.) 
To compare the perceived and environmental uncertainty we calculate the difference between the 
variances of perceived and unmodified resource distributions. After calculations we get that: 
 
(5) 
where # is the mean of the environmental resource distribution. 
If we have that 
 (6) 
it can be proven that 
 
(7) 
We also have that  
 
 
(8) 
 
Equations (7) and (8) imply that 
 
(9) 
If R$[0,Rm]. So, combining equations (5) and (9) we deduce that 
 
(10) 
showing that the perceived uncertainty is higher than the environmental uncertainty. 
Our analysis shows that we need to differentiate between environmental and perceived 
uncertainties. The environmental uncertainty is the variance of the whole resource distribution within 
the environment, while the perceived uncertainty is the variance of the modified resource distribution 
perceived by the individuals living in the environment. We have shown here that perceived uncertainty 
is larger than environmental uncertainty if our assumptions are satisfied (i.e. finite environmental 
uncertainty and more than half of the full resource distribution within the acceptable range). (We note 
that in the context of everyday life it may happen that perceived uncertainty is lower than 
environmental uncertainty, e.g. in case of high speed driving, or stock market crashes. The reason for 
this is that in these cases the environmental uncertainty is infinite, the perceived uncertainty is finite, 
and the infinite nature of the environmental uncertainty is expressed by relatively frequently observable 
extreme ranges of relevant distributions.) 
Perceived uncertainty, effective uncertainty and cooperation
Cooperation between individuals essentially means sharing of the uncertainty associated with their 
individual lives. In the context of the simplified scenario described in the previous section, individuals 
search for resources and by cooperation they share their finds. By sharing they reduce the variance of 
the distribution of the resources available for them.  
Putting it more formally, let us suppose that c is the proportion of those individuals that cooperate, 
and 1-c is the proportion of individuals that cheat. This means that the proportion of those who benefit 
from cooperation is c2, of those who cheat is c(1-c), of those who are cheated is c(1-c), and of those 
who do not enter in sharing interaction with others is (1-c)2. When both agents try to cheat, they do not 
share their resources and their perceived resource distributions do not change as an effect of the 
cheat/cheat interaction. 
Those individuals who cheat gain extra resources without sharing and those who are cheated lose 
resources without gaining from sharing. The simplest way to model these effects on their perceived 
resource distribution is to consider that the resource distribution for cheaters is shifted to the right, and 
for those who are cheated is shifted to the left. This means that we get the following formulas for the 
mean and variance of the effective resource distribution: 
 
 
(11) 
where the subscript ‘coop’ refers to those agents who benefit from cooperation, ‘cheat’ refers to agents 
that cheat, ‘suck’ refers to agents that are cheated, ‘no’ refers to agents which do not participate in 
sharing interactions, and r is the amount by which the resource distribution is shifted for the cheating 
(to the right, i.e. +r) and cheated agents (to the left, i.e. -r); 
 
 
(12) 
where  
 
(13) 
and !2coop is the variance of the resource distribution for those who benefit from cooperation, !
2
cheat is 
the variance of the resource distribution for those who cheat, !2suck is the variance of the resource 
distribution for those who are cheated, and !2no is the variance of the resource distribution for those 
who do not participate in sharing interaction with others. 
In accordance with the above suppositions the effect on the variance of the cheater and cheated 
resource distributions is equivalent to shifting the cut-off point Rm to the right for those who are 
cheated, and to the left for the cheaters. Consequently, following the implication of equation (10), the 
resource variance for cheaters will be lower than the perceived variance defined in the previous section, 
and the variance for those who are cheated will be larger than the perceived variance. To make things 
simple let us suppose that 
 
(14) 
and 
 
(15) 
In case of individuals who do not enter in sharing interactions their resource variance is exactly the 
perceived variance. For individuals who participate in cooperation the resource variance is 
 (16) 
Considering equations (13) – (16) we calculate the effective resource variance for the population of 
individuals using equation (17). 
Equation (17) shows that the effective uncertainty measured for the whole population is smaller 
than the perceived uncertainty if there is some level of cooperation within the society of individuals. 
 
 
(17) 
Equations (17) and (13) also show that if there is no cooperation between individuals (i.e. c = 0) the 
effective uncertainty is equal to the perceived uncertainty (!2e = !
2
s). Cooperation reduces effective 
uncertainty, buffering individuals against high environmental and perceived uncertainty. 
We have shown in this section that a third important aspect of uncertainty is effective uncertainty, 
which is measured as the variance of the distribution  of resources gained by the whole population of 
individuals constituting a social group or society. Our analysis shows that the effective uncertainty is 
lower than the perceived uncertainty if there is some level of cooperation within the population. 
Multi-agent simulation 
We built an agent-based simulation (using the programming language Delphi 4 for development) to 
examine how our analytical results would be expressed in a particular social environment. Further work 
of this kind can show how a variety of social and environmental factors influence uncertainty, and how 
uncertainty impacts on the social world. Our agents own resources (R) that they spend on living costs 
and use to generate new resources for the future. The agents live in a two-dimensional world with 
discrete time. Each agent has a position (x,y) and changes location by random movements, i.e. (xnew, 
ynew) = (x,y) + (ux,uy), where ux,uy are small random numbers. The agents occupy point-like positions 
within their world. This implies that agents may occupy positions very close to each other; however it 
is unlikely that their positions would be identical. The agents move in their world together with their 
resources. The agents live at most for Tmax discrete time units, and they start their life with a randomly 
set amount T0 of time steps already spent (i.e. the actual life length of the agent is Tmax – T0). 
The agents have an inclination toward cooperation or cheating, expressed as p the probability of 
cooperation. If p<0.5 they are more likely to cheat than to cooperate. They select their behaviour for 
each interaction in a probabilistic manner biased by their inclination. This is done by choosing a 
random number q from a uniform distribution over [0,1]; if q<p they cooperate, otherwise they cheat. 
In each time unit, each agent randomly chooses an interaction partner from its neighbourhood and the 
partners decide whether to cooperate or cheat. The neighbourhood of an agent consists of a given size 
set of closest other agents (in our simulation we considered the 10 closest other agents).   
The agents play a Prisoner’s Dilemma type game with their chosen partner. The agents enter the 
game with all of their available resources. The amount of resources that an agent owns after playing the 
game is given by the actual payoff for the agent from the game. The actual payoffs for the agents are 
determined by sampling a random variable XR that has normal distribution N(#X,!X). The mean value 
#X is determined by the amount of available resources according to the pay-off table shown in Table 1. 
The values in the pay-off table are such that the table satisfies the conditions of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
games (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). The variance !X represents the environmental uncertainty. In 
other words, suppose there are two agents A1, A2 having resource amounts R
t
1, R
t
2 at moment t. The 
agents play the game entering with all their available resources. According to the pay-off matrix of the 
game (see Table 1) the values #X1, #X2 are determined using the resource amount values R
t
1, R
t
2. For 
both agents a new resource amount value is picked by taking sample values Rt+11, R
t+1
2 from their 
calculated resource distributions N(#X1,!X) and N(#X2,!X). These values will be the resource amounts 
available for the agents at moment t+1. 
Table 1. The pay-off matrix for the cooperation / cheating game. Entries indicate the payoffs to the 
row player followed by the column player. R1 and R2 are the amount of resources of the row and 
column player respectively, and %=[f(R1+R2)-f(R1)-f(R2)]+ (i.e., it takes only the positive values of the 
expression in brackets and it is zero if the value of the expression is negative). The function f is a 
diminishing return function, and R1 and R2 are typically in the range where 2f(x)"f(2x), and 0<a<1. 
#X Cooperate Cheat 
Cooperate f(R1)+%/2, f(R2)+%/2 a&f(R1), f(R2)+% 
Cheat f(R1)+%, a&f(R2) f(R1), f(R2)  
 
Environmental harshness is modelled by a cut-off value Rm. Resource amounts below the cut-off 
value are equated to zero. Varying the value of Rm allows us to investigate how environmental, 
perceived and effective uncertainty relate to each other in the context of an agent society with agents 
that may cooperate. We did not explicitly model the perception of the environment by our agents. It is 
sufficient for our purposes to model their subjective perceptions by choosing the cut-off value Rm. 
The agents produce offspring at the end of their lifetime. The offspring inherit their parent’s 
behavioural inclination with some small random change (i.e., poffspring = pparent+u, u$[-w,w], and w is a 
small number, e.g., w=0.025). The number of offspring (n) depends on the amount of resources of the 
agent according to the equation 
 
(18) 
where # is the mean and !R is the variance of resources in the current population of agents, and b1, b2, 
n0 are parameters. The offspring share equally the resources of their parent. The offspring start their life 
from their parent’s last location with minor random changes, implying that the offspring of each agent 
will be closely packed at the beginning of their life. The cluster of offspring diffuses with time, as the 
offspring make their random movements. The generation of offspring guarantees the evolutionary 
change in the population of our agents. Successful agents produce many offspring, while unsuccessful 
agents produce few or no offspring. The success of the agents (i.e. the amount of resources that they 
accumulate) depends on their inclination to cooperation / cheating and on the uncertainty of their 
environment.  
 Figure 2: The relationship between the environmental and perceived variances  for different 
resource amount cut-off points. 
We simulated the evolution of 20 agent populations at four different cut-off levels representing 
environments with different harshness but with the same environmental uncertainty (i.e. we ran 20 
simulations for each level of environmental harshness). Each population started with around 1500 
individuals and the simulation ran for 1000 time units, the agents’ mean lifetime being 50 time units 
(Tmax = 60, T0$[0,20] with uniform distribution). The inclination toward cooperation by the agents was 
set randomly according to a uniform distribution over [0,1]. We calculated for each simulation, for 
each time round the environmental, perceived, and effective variances of the generated resources (i.e. 
environmental, perceived and effective uncertainties). The perceived variance was calculated by 
considering the amounts of resources that could be generated without cooperation and applying the cut-
off at the appropriate set level of Rm. The effective variance of resources was calculated considering the 
effects of the cooperation games played by the agents and also the cut-off at the level of Rm, i.e. 
considering the actual payoffs received by the agents after playing their games. 
Based on the earlier theoretical analysis we expect that the perceived variance should be above the 
environmental variance, and that the effective variance should be below the perceived variance. We are 
also interested in the nature of the relationship between these aspects of environmental uncertainty. 
 Figure 2 presents the relationship between the environmental and perceived variances of the 
resources for four levels of cut-off resource amounts (Rm = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3). These graphs show that 
indeed as we expected the perceived uncertainty is larger than the environmental uncertainty if the cut-
off level is above zero. The graphs also show that as the environmental harshness increases (i.e. 
increasing cut-off level) the difference between the perceived and environmental uncertainty increases 
and this difference grows more rapidly as the environmental uncertainty grows.  
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the perceived and effective variances of the resources. The 
graphs show that the effective uncertainty stays in a narrow range for the whole range of perceived 
uncertainty values. The graphs also show that the range of effective variances is well below the values 
of perceived variances. The fact that the range of effective variances is very narrow indicates that agent 
societies have the appropriate level of cooperation that allows the stable growth (possibly zero growth 
rate – in case of close to horizontal population size growth curves) of the society (see Figure 4). 
Population size decreases  as  the value of the resource cut-off point  increases (see Figure 4)  since as 
this value increases a greater range of resource values are ignored and therefore more opportunities for 
resource gain are lost. 
The results confirm our expectations and show that indeed it is important to consider the three 
identified aspects of uncertainty in  order to understand the  influence of uncertainty on the evolution of 
social structures, and in particular on the evolution of cooperation. The results also point to the need for 
a more detailed investigation of the relationship between the level of cooperation and the difference 
between the perceived and effective uncertainty. 
 Figure 3: The relationship between the perceived and effective variances for different resource 
amount cut-off points. 
 
Figure 4: The evolution of the average population count (the size of the population) calculated for 
the four simulation cases with different cut-off points. 
Conclusions
We have analysed three aspects of uncertainty in the context of cooperation in communities of selfish 
individuals and have shown that perceived uncertainty is greater than environmental uncertainty, and 
that effective uncertainty is lower than perceived uncertainty if there is some level of cooperation 
within the environment. 
We analysed a series of simulations of a multi-agent world, in which populations of agents evolve. 
The simulation data demonstrated how the three types of uncertainty are related in a particular social 
context. 
Our analysis highlights the importance of uncertainty for the evolution of social interactions, and 
clarifies the key aspects of uncertainty in this context. Our work shows that cooperation reduces 
effective uncertainty, thus protecting individual organisms from the dangers of high environmental or 
perceived uncertainty. We believe that experimental biological data analysed in sufficient detail will 
confirm our predictions about the three aspects of uncertainty based on analytical and simulation 
results.  
Our work also has implications in the context of designing artificial agent worlds. In this respect 
our results point to the importance of considering the effects of uncertainty for the development of such 
agent worlds. In particular, our work highlights the importance of appropriate tuning of perceived 
uncertainty and of the effects of cooperation on the effective uncertainty, which might contribute 
significantly to the achievement of the desired mixture of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour 
within the artificial agent world. 
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